Cybersecurity: Stakeholder incentives,externalities, and policy options

Information security breaches are increasingly motivated by fraudulent and criminal motives. Reducing their considerable costs has become a pressing issue. Although cybersecurity has strong public good characteristics, most information security decisions are made by individual stakeholders. Due to the interconnectedness of cyberspace, these decentralized decisions are afflicted with externalities that can result in sub-optimal security levels. Devising effective solutions to this problem is complicated by the global nature of cyberspace, the interdependence of stakeholders, as well as the diversity and heterogeneity of players. The paper develops a framework for studying the co-evolution of the markets for cybercrime and cybersecurity. It examines the incentives of stakeholders to provide for security and their implications for the ICT ecosystem. The findings show that market and non-market relations in the information infrastructure generate many security-enhancing incentives. However, pervasive externalities remain that can only be corrected by voluntary or government-led collective measures.     

On the Welfare Cost of Economic Fluctuations in Developing Countries*

Macroeconomic fluctuations are much stronger in developing countries than in the United States. Yet, while a large literature debates the welfare cost of economic fluctuations in the United States, it remains an open question how large that cost is in developing countries. Using several models, we provide such a measure. We find that the welfare cost of consumption volatility per se is far from trivial and averages a substantial multiple of the corresponding U.S. estimate. Moreover, in many poor countries, the welfare gain from eliminating volatility may in fact exceed the welfare gain from an additional percentage point of growth forever.     

Credit Risk Models – Do They Deliver Their Promises? A Quantitative Assessment

We develop a framework to assess the statistical significance of expected default frequency calculated by credit risk models. This framework is then used to analyse the quality of two commercially available models that have become popular among practitioners: KMV Credit Monitor and RiskCalc from Moody's.
Using a unique database of expected default probability from both vendors, we study both the consistency of the prediction and its timeliness. We introduce the concept of cumulative accuracy profile (CAP) that allows to see in one curve the percentage of defaulting companies captured by the models one year in advance. We also use the Miller's information test to see if the models add information to the S&P rating.
The result of the analysis indicates that these models indeed add relevant information not accounted for by rating alone. Moreover, with respect to rating agencies, the models predict defaults more than ten months in advance on average.
(J.E.L.: C52).     

Upward and downward influence tactics in managerial networks: A comparative study of Hong Kong Chinese and Americans

This paper reports an empirical investigation of individual preferences in the use of managerial influence tactics by Hong Kong Chinese and Americans. Subjects in a cross-cultural scenario study were asked to evaluate alternative upward and downward influence tactics in terms of their preferred usage. The findings indicate a main effect for culture and for direction of influence attempt. In addition, direction of influence attempt interacts with subject gender and culture on a tactic-by-tactic basis to reveal differences in influence preferences. Implications of the findings and directions for future studies are discussed.This research was supported by The Chinese University of Hong Kong. The special assistance of Mimi Kam and Ricky Lam in back-translation of the research instruments is appreciated, as are the contributions of Joseph Raelin of Boston College and Harold Welsch of Depaul University in data collection.     

Restructuring the State-Owned Banking Sector: A Comparative Assessment of Approaches in Central Europe

MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies -     

Capacity Commitment versus Flexibility

We show how technological flexibility choices and equilibrium configurations (both simultaneous and sequential duopoly) depend on six industry characteristics. Low market volatility combined with intermediate market size favors inflexible technologies; large values of either volatility or size favor flexible technologies; low or intermediate values of both favor the coexistence of flexible and inflexible technologies. The possibility of a flexibility trap exists in industries of low volatility and intermediate size. Entry prevention can sometimes be achieved by inflexible technologies or flexible technologies, depending on the industry characteristics.     

Prudence, Demand Uncertainty, Background Risk, and the Law of Supply: A Nonexpected Utility Approach to the Firm

We identify two motives, prudence and risk aversion, which give rise to precautionary behavior for a quantity- or price-setting monopolist facing demand uncertainty who has dual theoretic preferences. We also analyze a piecewise linear profit function due to a tax on profits that varies with the profit level. We show that the comparative statics of greater risk (mean-preserving spread and mean-utility preserving spread) can be totally or partially determined by the Diamond-Stiglitz and Kihlstrom-Mirman single-crossing property. For example, for a prudent risk-averse quantity-setting dual theoretic monopolist, a mean-preserving spread will have the same impact on output under uncertainty as a fall in the state of demand under certainty. Finally, we find that, in contrast to expected utility, a stochastically larger state of demand (first-order stochastic dominance) will raise output even if background risk is present.     

Scenario building: Uses and abuses

Scenarios hold little interest if they are not pertinent, coherent, and plausible. Although foresight requires a rigorous approach to address complex problems, the tools must also be simple enough to be easily used. Since the mid-1980s, the approach in strategic prospective workshops (a term that reminds us of the participatory nature of the French approach) has proven its effectiveness in meeting these criteria (simple, rigorous and appropriable; i.e., may be appropriated by participants). The authors try to reply to simple and important questions: What is a scenario? How to judge the quality of a scenario? Which strategies for which scenarios? These questions remind us that applications of strategic foresight tools are contingent and modular. They could also involve the stakeholders from upstream to downstream, as seen in the agro-food sector. Finally, they argue that the future still has to be built and that futurists produced too many scenarios and not enough projects.     

Sequential location equilibria under incomplete information

Summary We consider a simple model of incomplete information in location theory. Two firms compete in a two stage framework: a sequential location stage and a price competition stage. Firm 1 knows both its own constant marginal cost technology and that of Firm 2, whereas the latter has incomplete information about firm 1's technology. The location stage turns out to be a monotonic signaling game and theunique D1 equilibrium is a pure strategy separating equilibrium if firm 1's cost advantage is below some bound, and otherwise a pooling equilibrium if the prior probability that Firm 1 is of the low cost type is high, or a semi-pooling equilibrium if it is low. This surprising result is due to the fact that the location gap between the two types of Firm 1 is bounded because of natural economic reasons, which may prevent the separation of the two types. Hence, incomplete information matters: the equilibrium locations differ quite significantly from the full information equilibrium locations.We would like to thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments and also the participants in seminars at GREQE (Marseille), Université de Montréal, UBC, HEC (Paris), in the Location Theory session of the World Congress of the Econometric Society (Barcelona) and in the Game Theory Conference at the University of Western Ontario for their comments. We remain, of course, solely responsible for the content of the paper. Financial support from FCAR (Québec), SSHRCC (Canada) and CNRS (France) is gratefully acknowledged.